Files
uncle6me-web 10d150ac2b fix(mcp): MCP 用登入者的身分查詢,不再去找一把服務內部金鑰
leo 2026-08-12:「人類進 Portal 輸入帳密表示你是主人,可以查到你權限所有東西;
AI 透過輸入帳密的 MCP 查詢表示是授權的 AI,可以查到主人允許查的任何東西。」
「掛上 MCP 並輸入帳密,那個動作本身就是授權」⇒ 下游不得再要求第二次認證。

病根(不是金鑰沒同步,是身分沒接住):
  oauth/routes.ts 驗完 Portal 帳密只留下 `loginOk = res.ok` 一個布林值,身分當場丟棄,
  namespace 改從 `MCP_OWNER_NAMESPACE || "leo"` 拿。於是查詢時手上沒有身分可帶,
  只好用 KBDB_INTERNAL_TOKEN 直打 KBDB——那條路繞過 portal 所有庫過濾,
  而且不管誰登入都看到同一格、看到全部。CLI 也從不注入 MCP_OWNER_NAMESPACE,
  所以那個 "leo" 預設值是每台實例的實際行為,不是理論上的邊角。

修法(走既有那條路,不發明新的):
1. 接住身分:/authorize 解析 /portal/login 回應,把 portal session token +
   display_name/role/libraries 存進 authorization code → access token。
   /portal/login 補回 session_expires_in,access_token TTL 夾成
   min(自己的 TTL, portal session TTL)——不讓「MCP 還連著、底下 session 早死」。
   cypher 回 200 但沒給 session_token(舊版)→ 不發碼,不簽一張沒有身分的 token。
2. 攜帶身分:kbdb_* 全部改走 cypher `/portal/data/*`,Authorization 帶登入者的
   session。庫過濾/租戶注入/停用即時生效全在 server 側,與人類走 portal 網頁同一道閘。
   kbdb_graph_neighbors 因此不再需要 kbdb_base(server 自己知道查哪個庫)。
   藏書地圖(含連線時注入 instructions 的那份)同樣只回有權限的庫,快取改 per-session
   分格——地圖本身就是情報,不能讓先連上的人把視野留給下一個。
3. fail-closed:舊 token 沒有身分 → 誠實要求重新連線,不偷偷退回服務金鑰那條老路。
   服務級憑據(static token / partner key)維持既有 KBDB 直連,arcrun_* 零回歸。

新增 cypher portal 資料面端點(能力長在 API,MCP 只暴露;rule 07):
  GET  /portal/data/map、/portal/data/map/:library
  GET  /portal/data/templates、POST /portal/data/templates
  GET  /portal/data/records/by-template/:t、GET /portal/data/records/:id
  POST /portal/data/records
全部:呼叫端自帶 owner_id 一律不生效;越權與不存在同回 404;寫入 owner_id 由 server 定死。

KBDB base:`GET /records/:id` 與 by-template 補回 owner_id 欄位——原本不回,
呼叫端無從判斷「這筆是不是我的」,按 id 直讀等於沒有租戶邊界。

沒動:KBDB fail-closed 閘、任何金鑰、租戶字串仍不下發給呼叫端。

驗證:
  mcp        tsc 綠;vitest 113/113 綠(改前 48 綠 29 紅)
  cypher     vitest 400 綠 / 14 紅,14 紅與 base commit a24f291 逐條相同(既有)
  kbdb       vitest 208 綠 / 5 紅,5 紅同為既有(migrations/*.sql 被 gitignore)
  端到端     ◐ 未驗:需部署到 leo21c,那道閘要 leo 親手解(見 PR)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:33:12 +08:00

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This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
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import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { Hono } from "hono";
import {
randomToken,
sha256Base64Url,
sha256Hex,
constantTimeEqual,
verifyPkceS256,
} from "../../src/oauth/crypto.js";
import {
putAuthCode,
consumeAuthCode,
putAccessToken,
getAccessToken,
} from "../../src/oauth/store.js";
import {
originOf,
resourceUri,
normalizeResource,
resourceMatches,
protectedResourceMetadata,
authorizationServerMetadata,
wwwAuthenticateHeader,
} from "../../src/oauth/metadata.js";
import { esc, consentPage } from "../../src/oauth/consent.js";
import { registerOAuthRoutes } from "../../src/oauth/routes.js";
import type { Env } from "../../src/types.js";
// ── 記憶體 KV mock(支援 expirationTtl → 用 exp 過期;delete)─────────────────────
function makeKV(): KVNamespace {
const map = new Map<string, { value: string; exp?: number }>();
const kv = {
async put(key: string, value: string, opts?: { expirationTtl?: number }) {
map.set(key, {
value,
exp: opts?.expirationTtl ? Date.now() + opts.expirationTtl * 1000 : undefined,
});
},
async get(key: string) {
const e = map.get(key);
if (!e) return null;
if (e.exp && e.exp < Date.now()) {
map.delete(key);
return null;
}
return e.value;
},
async delete(key: string) {
map.delete(key);
},
};
return kv as unknown as KVNamespace;
}
// PKCEverifier "1234...43+ chars" → 直接算 challenge。
async function pkcePair() {
const verifier = "a".repeat(64);
const challenge = await sha256Base64Url(verifier);
return { verifier, challenge };
}
/**
* cypher `/portal/login` 的假替身(2026-08-12 起 MCP 的把關就是這支——用使用者自己的
* Portal 帳密,沒有另一把 owner secret)。帳密對 → 回 session_token 身分欄位;不對 → 401。
*/
const GOOD_EMAIL = "leo@example.com";
const GOOD_PASSWORD = "correct horse";
function cypherMock(
over: {
/** null 登入成功但**不回** session_token(舊版 cypher);預設回 "sess-abc" */
sessionToken?: string | null;
displayName?: string;
role?: string;
libraries?: string[];
sessionExpiresIn?: number;
} = {},
): { fetcher: Fetcher; calls: Array<{ email: string; password: string }> } {
const calls: Array<{ email: string; password: string }> = [];
const fetcher = {
async fetch(req: Request) {
const body = (await req.json()) as { email: string; password: string };
calls.push(body);
if (body.email !== GOOD_EMAIL || body.password !== GOOD_PASSWORD) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "email 或密碼錯誤" }), { status: 401 });
}
const sessionToken = over.sessionToken === undefined ? "sess-abc" : over.sessionToken;
return new Response(
JSON.stringify({
success: true,
...(sessionToken ? { session_token: sessionToken } : {}),
display_name: over.displayName ?? "Leo",
role: over.role ?? "admin",
libraries: over.libraries ?? ["*"],
session_expires_in: over.sessionExpiresIn ?? 604800,
}),
{ status: 200, headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } },
);
},
} as unknown as Fetcher;
return { fetcher, calls };
}
function baseEnv(over: Partial<Env> = {}): Env {
return {
COMPONENT_REGISTRY: {} as Fetcher,
CYPHER_EXECUTOR: cypherMock().fetcher,
KBDB: {} as Fetcher,
KBDB_INTERNAL_TOKEN: "internal",
OAUTH_KV: makeKV(),
MCP_OWNER_NAMESPACE: "leo",
...over,
} as Env;
}
// ── crypto ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("oauth/crypto", () => {
it("randomToken 長度足夠且每次不同", () => {
const a = randomToken();
const b = randomToken();
expect(a).not.toBe(b);
expect(a.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(40);
expect(a).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9\-_]+$/); // base64url 無 padding
});
it("sha256Hex/base64url 為已知值", async () => {
// echo -n "abc" | sha256sum → ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad
expect(await sha256Hex("abc")).toBe(
"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad",
);
// RFC 7636 附錄範例:verifier → challenge
expect(await sha256Base64Url("dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk")).toBe(
"E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM",
);
});
it("constantTimeEqual 正確", () => {
expect(constantTimeEqual("abc", "abc")).toBe(true);
expect(constantTimeEqual("abc", "abd")).toBe(false);
expect(constantTimeEqual("abc", "abcd")).toBe(false);
});
it("verifyPkceS256S256 正確、拒 plain/短 verifier/竄改", async () => {
const { verifier, challenge } = await pkcePair();
expect(await verifyPkceS256(verifier, challenge, "S256")).toBe(true);
expect(await verifyPkceS256(verifier, challenge, "plain")).toBe(false);
expect(await verifyPkceS256(verifier, challenge, undefined)).toBe(false);
expect(await verifyPkceS256("short", challenge, "S256")).toBe(false);
expect(await verifyPkceS256("b".repeat(64), challenge, "S256")).toBe(false);
});
});
// ── store(短效 KV)────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("oauth/store", () => {
it("authorization code 一次性:consume 後即失效(防重放)", async () => {
const kv = makeKV();
await putAuthCode(kv, "code-1", {
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: "https://claude.ai/cb",
code_challenge: "cc",
code_challenge_method: "S256",
scope: "mcp",
resource: "https://mcp/mcp",
namespace: "leo",
portal: { session: "sess-abc", display_name: "Leo", role: "admin", libraries: ["*"] },
portal_session_expires_in: 604800,
});
const first = await consumeAuthCode(kv, "code-1");
expect(first?.namespace).toBe("leo");
const second = await consumeAuthCode(kv, "code-1");
expect(second).toBeNull();
});
it("access token 存取 + exp 過期回 null", async () => {
const kv = makeKV();
await putAccessToken(
kv,
"tok-1",
{ namespace: "leo", client_id: "c1", scope: "mcp", aud: "https://mcp/mcp", exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 100 },
100,
);
expect((await getAccessToken(kv, "tok-1"))?.namespace).toBe("leo");
// 已過期
await putAccessToken(
kv,
"tok-2",
{ namespace: "leo", client_id: "c1", scope: "mcp", aud: "x", exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 10 },
100,
);
expect(await getAccessToken(kv, "tok-2")).toBeNull();
});
it("KV key 為 hash(不把 raw token 當 key", async () => {
// 白盒:store 內部用 sha256Hex,這裡驗 hash 與 raw 不同即可
expect(await sha256Hex("tok-1")).not.toContain("tok-1");
});
});
// ── metadata ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("oauth/metadata", () => {
it("originOf / resourceUri", () => {
expect(originOf("https://Mcp.Arcrun.dev/mcp")).toBe("https://mcp.arcrun.dev");
expect(resourceUri("https://mcp.arcrun.dev")).toBe("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp");
});
it("protectedResourceMetadata 必要欄位", () => {
const m = protectedResourceMetadata("https://mcp.arcrun.dev");
expect(m.resource).toBe("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp");
expect(m.authorization_servers).toEqual(["https://mcp.arcrun.dev"]);
});
it("authorizationServerMetadata 必要欄位(S256/code/none", () => {
const m = authorizationServerMetadata("https://mcp.arcrun.dev");
expect(m.authorization_endpoint).toBe("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/authorize");
expect(m.token_endpoint).toBe("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/token");
expect(m.registration_endpoint).toBe("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/register");
expect(m.response_types_supported).toEqual(["code"]);
expect(m.code_challenge_methods_supported).toEqual(["S256"]);
expect(m.token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported).toEqual(["none"]);
});
it("wwwAuthenticateHeader 指向 protected-resource metadata", () => {
expect(wwwAuthenticateHeader("https://mcp.arcrun.dev")).toBe(
'Bearer resource_metadata="https://mcp.arcrun.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"',
);
});
it("normalizeResource:尾斜線 / 大小寫 scheme+host / 預設 port 都正規化成 canonical", () => {
const canon = "https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp";
expect(normalizeResource("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp")).toBe(canon);
expect(normalizeResource("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp/")).toBe(canon); // 尾斜線
expect(normalizeResource("HTTPS://Mcp.Arcrun.Dev/mcp")).toBe(canon); // 大小寫 scheme+host
expect(normalizeResource("https://mcp.arcrun.dev:443/mcp")).toBe(canon); // 預設 port
expect(normalizeResource("not a url")).toBeNull();
});
it("resourceMatchescanonical / 尾斜線變體都 true;別的 host/path false", () => {
const origin = "https://mcp.arcrun.dev";
expect(resourceMatches("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp", origin)).toBe(true);
expect(resourceMatches("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp/", origin)).toBe(true);
expect(resourceMatches("https://other.example.com/mcp", origin)).toBe(false);
expect(resourceMatches("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/other", origin)).toBe(false);
expect(resourceMatches("garbage", origin)).toBe(false);
});
});
// ── consent escaping(XSS)────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("oauth/consent", () => {
it("esc 跳脫 HTML 特殊字元", () => {
expect(esc(`<script>"&'`)).toBe("&lt;script&gt;&quot;&amp;&#39;");
});
it("consentPage 把惡意 state 跳脫掉(不注入)", () => {
const html = consentPage({
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: "https://claude.ai/cb",
state: '"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>',
code_challenge: "cc",
code_challenge_method: "S256",
scope: "mcp",
resource: "r",
});
expect(html).not.toContain("<img src=x");
expect(html).toContain("&lt;img src=x");
});
});
// ── 完整 OAuth 流程(route 整合)──────────────────────────────────────────────
function buildApp(env: Env) {
const app = new Hono<{ Bindings: Env }>();
registerOAuthRoutes(app);
return {
req: (path: string, init?: RequestInit) =>
app.request("https://mcp.arcrun.dev" + path, init, env),
};
}
describe("oauth flow (整合)", () => {
it("well-known metadata 端點以 request origin 動態生成", async () => {
const app = buildApp(baseEnv());
const r = await app.req("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource");
expect(r.status).toBe(200);
const j = await r.json();
expect(j.resource).toBe("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp");
const r2 = await app.req("/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server");
expect((await r2.json()).issuer).toBe("https://mcp.arcrun.dev");
});
it("/register 回 client_idpublic client,無 secret", async () => {
const app = buildApp(baseEnv());
const r = await app.req("/register", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ redirect_uris: ["https://claude.ai/cb"], client_name: "Claude" }),
});
expect(r.status).toBe(201);
const j = await r.json();
expect(j.client_id).toMatch(/^mcp_/);
expect(j.token_endpoint_auth_method).toBe("none");
expect(j).not.toHaveProperty("client_secret");
});
it("/register 擋不允許的 redirect_uri host", async () => {
const app = buildApp(baseEnv());
const r = await app.req("/register", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ redirect_uris: ["https://evil.example.com/cb"] }),
});
expect(r.status).toBe(400);
expect((await r.json()).error).toBe("invalid_redirect_uri");
});
it("GET /authorize 要求 PKCE S256 且顯示同意頁", async () => {
const app = buildApp(baseEnv());
const { challenge } = await pkcePair();
const ok = await app.req(
`/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=c1&redirect_uri=${encodeURIComponent(
"https://claude.ai/cb",
)}&code_challenge=${challenge}&code_challenge_method=S256&state=xyz&scope=mcp`,
);
expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
const consentHtml = await ok.text();
// 同意頁問的是 Portal 帳密(不是另一把 owner secret
expect(consentHtml).toContain("Portal");
expect(consentHtml).toContain('name="email"');
expect(consentHtml).toContain('name="password"');
// 缺 PKCE → 400
const bad = await app.req(
`/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=c1&redirect_uri=${encodeURIComponent(
"https://claude.ai/cb",
)}`,
);
expect(bad.status).toBe(400);
});
it("GET /authorize:不需要任何 owner 祕密就看得到同意頁(封測者接自己的 AI 不會死在這頁)", async () => {
// 舊行為:未設 MCP_OWNER_SECRET → 503 ⇒ 每個封測者都卡住。現在把關是 Portal 帳密。
const app = buildApp(baseEnv());
const { challenge } = await pkcePair();
const r = await app.req(
`/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=c1&redirect_uri=${encodeURIComponent(
"https://claude.ai/cb",
)}&code_challenge=${challenge}&code_challenge_method=S256`,
);
expect(r.status).toBe(200);
});
it("完整 code→token:正確 Portal 帳密 + 正確 verifier → access_token", async () => {
const env = baseEnv();
const app = buildApp(env);
const { verifier, challenge } = await pkcePair();
const redirect = "https://claude.ai/cb";
// POST /authorize 正確祕密 → 302 帶 code
const authRes = await app.req("/authorize", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: redirect,
state: "st-1",
code_challenge: challenge,
code_challenge_method: "S256",
scope: "mcp",
resource: "https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp",
email: GOOD_EMAIL,
password: GOOD_PASSWORD,
}).toString(),
redirect: "manual",
});
expect(authRes.status).toBe(302);
const loc = new URL(authRes.headers.get("location")!);
expect(loc.searchParams.get("state")).toBe("st-1");
const code = loc.searchParams.get("code")!;
expect(code).toBeTruthy();
// POST /token 正確 verifier → access_token
const tokRes = await app.req("/token", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code,
code_verifier: verifier,
redirect_uri: redirect,
client_id: "c1",
}).toString(),
});
expect(tokRes.status).toBe(200);
const tok = await tokRes.json();
expect(tok.token_type).toBe("Bearer");
expect(tok.access_token).toBeTruthy();
expect(tok.expires_in).toBeGreaterThan(0);
// 換發的 token 綁定 owner namespace
const at = await getAccessToken(env.OAUTH_KV!, tok.access_token);
expect(at?.namespace).toBe("leo");
expect(at?.aud).toBe("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp");
});
// ── 2026-08-12:身分要接住並攜帶(本次修的病根)─────────────────────────────
describe("登入者身分跟著 token 走(leo:掛上 MCP 並輸入帳密=授權,下游不得再問一次)", () => {
it("驗完帳密不是只留布林值:token 帶得出 portal session 與該帳號的可用知識庫", async () => {
const env = baseEnv({ CYPHER_EXECUTOR: cypherMock({ libraries: ["kb"], displayName: "小明", role: "user" }).fetcher });
const app = buildApp(env);
const { verifier, challenge } = await pkcePair();
const redirect = "https://claude.ai/cb";
const authRes = await app.req("/authorize", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: redirect,
code_challenge: challenge,
code_challenge_method: "S256",
email: GOOD_EMAIL,
password: GOOD_PASSWORD,
}).toString(),
redirect: "manual",
});
const code = new URL(authRes.headers.get("location")!).searchParams.get("code")!;
const tokRes = await app.req("/token", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code,
code_verifier: verifier,
redirect_uri: redirect,
}).toString(),
});
const at = await getAccessToken(env.OAUTH_KV!, (await tokRes.json()).access_token);
expect(at?.portal?.session).toBe("sess-abc");
expect(at?.portal?.display_name).toBe("小明");
expect(at?.portal?.role).toBe("user");
expect(at?.portal?.libraries).toEqual(["kb"]);
});
it("**不同帳號登入 → token 帶的身分跟著換**(不是不管誰登入都同一格)", async () => {
// 兩個帳號權限不同:一個全庫、一個只有 kb。token 裡的身分必須各自不同。
const envA = baseEnv({ CYPHER_EXECUTOR: cypherMock({ sessionToken: "sess-A", displayName: "Leo", libraries: ["*"] }).fetcher });
const envB = baseEnv({ CYPHER_EXECUTOR: cypherMock({ sessionToken: "sess-B", displayName: "小明", libraries: ["kb"] }).fetcher });
async function tokenFor(env: Env) {
const app = buildApp(env);
const { verifier, challenge } = await pkcePair();
const redirect = "https://claude.ai/cb";
const a = await app.req("/authorize", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: redirect,
code_challenge: challenge,
code_challenge_method: "S256",
email: GOOD_EMAIL,
password: GOOD_PASSWORD,
}).toString(),
redirect: "manual",
});
const code = new URL(a.headers.get("location")!).searchParams.get("code")!;
const t = await app.req("/token", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code,
code_verifier: verifier,
redirect_uri: redirect,
}).toString(),
});
return getAccessToken(env.OAUTH_KV!, (await t.json()).access_token);
}
const a = await tokenFor(envA);
const b = await tokenFor(envB);
expect(a?.portal?.session).not.toBe(b?.portal?.session);
expect(a?.portal?.libraries).toEqual(["*"]);
expect(b?.portal?.libraries).toEqual(["kb"]);
});
it("access_token 活不過它底下的 portal sessionTTL 取兩者較小)", async () => {
const env = baseEnv({
MCP_TOKEN_TTL: "2592000", // 30 天
CYPHER_EXECUTOR: cypherMock({ sessionExpiresIn: 3600 }).fetcher, // session 只有 1 小時
});
const app = buildApp(env);
const { verifier, challenge } = await pkcePair();
const redirect = "https://claude.ai/cb";
const a = await app.req("/authorize", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: redirect,
code_challenge: challenge,
code_challenge_method: "S256",
email: GOOD_EMAIL,
password: GOOD_PASSWORD,
}).toString(),
redirect: "manual",
});
const code = new URL(a.headers.get("location")!).searchParams.get("code")!;
const t = await app.req("/token", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code,
code_verifier: verifier,
redirect_uri: redirect,
}).toString(),
});
expect((await t.json()).expires_in).toBe(3600);
});
it("cypher 回 200 但沒給 session_token(舊版 cypher)→ 不發碼(不發一張沒有身分的 token)", async () => {
const app = buildApp(baseEnv({ CYPHER_EXECUTOR: cypherMock({ sessionToken: null }).fetcher }));
const { challenge } = await pkcePair();
const r = await app.req("/authorize", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: "https://claude.ai/cb",
code_challenge: challenge,
code_challenge_method: "S256",
email: GOOD_EMAIL,
password: GOOD_PASSWORD,
}).toString(),
redirect: "manual",
});
expect(r.status).toBe(401);
expect(r.headers.get("location")).toBeNull();
});
});
it("錯誤 owner 祕密 → 401、不發 code", async () => {
const app = buildApp(baseEnv());
const { challenge } = await pkcePair();
const r = await app.req("/authorize", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: "https://claude.ai/cb",
code_challenge: challenge,
code_challenge_method: "S256",
email: GOOD_EMAIL,
password: "WRONG",
}).toString(),
redirect: "manual",
});
expect(r.status).toBe(401);
expect(r.headers.get("location")).toBeNull();
expect(await r.text()).toContain("不正確");
});
it("/token 錯誤 verifier → invalid_grant;重用 code → invalid_grant", async () => {
const env = baseEnv();
const app = buildApp(env);
const { challenge } = await pkcePair();
const redirect = "https://claude.ai/cb";
const authRes = await app.req("/authorize", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: redirect,
code_challenge: challenge,
code_challenge_method: "S256",
email: GOOD_EMAIL,
password: GOOD_PASSWORD,
}).toString(),
redirect: "manual",
});
const code = new URL(authRes.headers.get("location")!).searchParams.get("code")!;
// 錯誤 verifier
const bad = await app.req("/token", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code,
code_verifier: "z".repeat(64),
redirect_uri: redirect,
}).toString(),
});
expect(bad.status).toBe(400);
expect((await bad.json()).error).toBe("invalid_grant");
// 該 code 已被 consume(即使失敗也一次性)→ 再用正確 verifier 也 invalid_grant
const reuse = await app.req("/token", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code,
code_verifier: "a".repeat(64),
redirect_uri: redirect,
}).toString(),
});
expect((await reuse.json()).error).toBe("invalid_grant");
});
it("未設 OAUTH_KV → /token 回 503(誠實,不假綠)", async () => {
const app = buildApp(baseEnv({ OAUTH_KV: undefined }));
const r = await app.req("/token", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code: "x",
code_verifier: "a".repeat(64),
redirect_uri: "https://claude.ai/cb",
}).toString(),
});
expect(r.status).toBe(503);
});
});
// ── RFC 8707 resource 簽發端驗證/正規化 ─────────────────────────────────────────
// 決策:resource 正規化後 == canonical → 接受(尾斜線/大小寫/預設 port 皆等價,aud 一律存 canonical
// /mcp 嚴格比對必過);正規化後 != canonical(別的 host/path)→ 簽發端 fail-fast 拒 invalid_target。
// 若把尾斜線也拒,claude.ai 真送尾斜線變體會永久連不上(把 401 問題換位重現),故等價形接受才對。
describe("oauth resourceRFC 8707)簽發端把關", () => {
const redirect = "https://claude.ai/cb";
async function postAuthorize(app: ReturnType<typeof buildApp>, resource: string, challenge: string) {
return app.req("/authorize", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: redirect,
state: "st",
code_challenge: challenge,
code_challenge_method: "S256",
resource,
email: GOOD_EMAIL,
password: GOOD_PASSWORD,
}).toString(),
redirect: "manual",
});
}
it("尾斜線變體(等價 canonical)→ 正常發碼,且換出 token 的 aud 為 canonical", async () => {
const env = baseEnv();
const app = buildApp(env);
const { verifier, challenge } = await pkcePair();
const r = await postAuthorize(app, "https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp/", challenge);
expect(r.status).toBe(302);
const loc = new URL(r.headers.get("location")!);
expect(loc.searchParams.get("error")).toBeNull(); // 未被拒
const code = loc.searchParams.get("code")!;
expect(code).toBeTruthy();
const tokRes = await app.req("/token", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code,
code_verifier: verifier,
redirect_uri: redirect,
resource: "https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp/", // token 端也帶尾斜線 → 正規化後仍通過
}).toString(),
});
expect(tokRes.status).toBe(200);
const at = await getAccessToken(env.OAUTH_KV!, (await tokRes.json()).access_token);
expect(at?.aud).toBe("https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp"); // 存的是 canonical,與 partner-auth 嚴格比對一致
});
it("正確 canonical resource → 正常發碼", async () => {
const app = buildApp(baseEnv());
const { challenge } = await pkcePair();
const r = await postAuthorize(app, "https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp", challenge);
expect(r.status).toBe(302);
expect(new URL(r.headers.get("location")!).searchParams.get("code")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("GET /authorize:別的 host 的 resource → redirect 帶 error=invalid_target(不顯示同意頁)", async () => {
const app = buildApp(baseEnv());
const { challenge } = await pkcePair();
const r = await app.req(
`/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=c1&redirect_uri=${encodeURIComponent(redirect)}` +
`&code_challenge=${challenge}&code_challenge_method=S256&state=st` +
`&resource=${encodeURIComponent("https://evil.example.com/mcp")}`,
);
expect(r.status).toBe(302);
const loc = new URL(r.headers.get("location")!);
expect(loc.searchParams.get("error")).toBe("invalid_target");
expect(loc.searchParams.get("state")).toBe("st");
expect(loc.searchParams.get("code")).toBeNull();
});
it("POST /authorize:別的 host 的 resource → redirect invalid_target,不發碼", async () => {
const app = buildApp(baseEnv());
const { challenge } = await pkcePair();
const r = await postAuthorize(app, "https://evil.example.com/mcp", challenge);
expect(r.status).toBe(302);
const loc = new URL(r.headers.get("location")!);
expect(loc.searchParams.get("error")).toBe("invalid_target");
expect(loc.searchParams.get("code")).toBeNull();
});
it("POST /token:別的 host 的 resource → 400 invalid_target", async () => {
const env = baseEnv();
const app = buildApp(env);
const { verifier, challenge } = await pkcePair();
// 先正常拿一個 codeauthorize 不帶 resource → 存 canonical
const authRes = await postAuthorize(app, "https://mcp.arcrun.dev/mcp", challenge);
const code = new URL(authRes.headers.get("location")!).searchParams.get("code")!;
const tokRes = await app.req("/token", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code,
code_verifier: verifier,
redirect_uri: redirect,
resource: "https://evil.example.com/mcp", // token 端 resource 不符 → 拒
}).toString(),
});
expect(tokRes.status).toBe(400);
expect((await tokRes.json()).error).toBe("invalid_target");
});
});
// ── 防 drift:對 OAUTH_KV 的每一次 put 都必須帶 expirationTtl(守儲存鐵律)──────────
// spy KV 記錄所有 put(key,value,opts);跑完整流程後斷言沒有任何一次「無 TTL」的 put,
// 防未來有人往這顆短效 KV 塞長效資料(access_token / code 以外的東西)。
describe("oauth store drift guardOAUTH_KV 的 put 一律帶 TTL", () => {
function spyKV(): { kv: KVNamespace; puts: Array<{ key: string; opts?: { expirationTtl?: number } }> } {
const map = new Map<string, string>();
const puts: Array<{ key: string; opts?: { expirationTtl?: number } }> = [];
const kv = {
async put(key: string, value: string, opts?: { expirationTtl?: number }) {
puts.push({ key, opts });
map.set(key, value);
},
async get(key: string) {
return map.get(key) ?? null;
},
async delete(key: string) {
map.delete(key);
},
} as unknown as KVNamespace;
return { kv, puts };
}
it("完整 authorize→token 流程中,OAUTH_KV 的每次 put 都有 expirationTtl>0", async () => {
const { kv, puts } = spyKV();
const env = baseEnv({ OAUTH_KV: kv });
const app = buildApp(env);
const { verifier, challenge } = await pkcePair();
const redirect = "https://claude.ai/cb";
const authRes = await app.req("/authorize", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: redirect,
code_challenge: challenge,
code_challenge_method: "S256",
email: GOOD_EMAIL,
password: GOOD_PASSWORD,
}).toString(),
redirect: "manual",
});
const code = new URL(authRes.headers.get("location")!).searchParams.get("code")!;
await app.req("/token", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code,
code_verifier: verifier,
redirect_uri: redirect,
client_id: "c1",
}).toString(),
});
// 至少發生了 putcode + token 各一),且每一次都帶 TTL。
expect(puts.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
for (const p of puts) {
expect(p.opts?.expirationTtl, `put ${p.key} 缺 expirationTtl`).toBeTypeOf("number");
expect(p.opts!.expirationTtl!).toBeGreaterThan(0);
}
});
it("直接呼叫 store 層 putAuthCode / putAccessToken 也一律帶 TTL", async () => {
const { kv, puts } = spyKV();
await putAuthCode(kv, "c", {
client_id: "c1",
redirect_uri: "https://claude.ai/cb",
code_challenge: "cc",
code_challenge_method: "S256",
scope: "mcp",
resource: "https://mcp/mcp",
namespace: "leo",
});
await putAccessToken(
kv,
"t",
{ namespace: "leo", client_id: "c1", scope: "mcp", aud: "https://mcp/mcp", exp: 1 },
100,
);
expect(puts).toHaveLength(2);
for (const p of puts) {
expect(p.opts?.expirationTtl).toBeGreaterThan(0);
}
});
});