// OAuth 2.1 + PKCE server 路由。掛在 worker 根路徑（非 /mcp basePath），
// 因為 well-known / authorize / token / register 都得在 origin 根，claude.ai 才發現得到。
// 安全模型與相容決策見 mcp/OAUTH.md。
import { Hono } from "hono";
import type { Env as HonoBaseEnv } from "hono";
import { Env } from "../types.js";
import {
  randomToken,
  verifyPkceS256,
  constantTimeEqual,
} from "./crypto.js";
import {
  putAuthCode,
  consumeAuthCode,
  putAccessToken,
  AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS,
} from "./store.js";
import {
  originOf,
  resourceUri,
  resourceMatches,
  protectedResourceMetadata,
  authorizationServerMetadata,
} from "./metadata.js";
import { consentPage, ConsentParams } from "./consent.js";

const DEFAULT_TOKEN_TTL = 2592000; // 30 天
const DEFAULT_REDIRECT_HOSTS = ["claude.ai", "claude.com", "anthropic.com"];

const CORS_JSON = {
  "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
  "Access-Control-Allow-Methods": "GET, POST, OPTIONS",
  "Access-Control-Allow-Headers": "Content-Type, Authorization",
  "Cache-Control": "no-store",
} as const;

function ownerNamespace(env: Env): string {
  return env.MCP_OWNER_NAMESPACE || "leo";
}

function tokenTtl(env: Env): number {
  const n = parseInt(env.MCP_TOKEN_TTL ?? "", 10);
  return Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? n : DEFAULT_TOKEN_TTL;
}

/** redirect_uri 白名單檢查（OAuth 2.1：http 只准 localhost，其餘須 https 且 host 在白名單）。 */
function isAllowedRedirect(uri: string, env: Env): boolean {
  let u: URL;
  try {
    u = new URL(uri);
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
  const host = u.hostname.toLowerCase();
  const isLocal = host === "localhost" || host === "127.0.0.1" || host === "::1";
  if (u.protocol === "http:") return isLocal; // http 僅限本機
  if (u.protocol !== "https:") return false;
  if (isLocal) return true;
  const configured = (env.MCP_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_HOSTS ?? "")
    .split(",")
    .map((s) => s.trim().toLowerCase())
    .filter(Boolean);
  const list = configured.length ? configured : DEFAULT_REDIRECT_HOSTS;
  return list.some((h) => host === h || host.endsWith("." + h));
}

/** 從 form 或 JSON body 讀參數（token/register 端點的 content-type 兩種都容忍）。 */
async function readParams(req: Request): Promise<Record<string, string>> {
  const ct = req.headers.get("content-type") ?? "";
  try {
    if (ct.includes("application/json")) {
      const j = (await req.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;
      const out: Record<string, string> = {};
      for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(j)) if (typeof v === "string") out[k] = v;
      return out;
    }
    const form = await req.formData();
    const out: Record<string, string> = {};
    for (const [k, v] of form.entries()) if (typeof v === "string") out[k] = v;
    return out;
  } catch {
    return {};
  }
}

/** 組 redirect 回 client 的 URL（把 query 併進 redirect_uri）。 */
function redirectWith(redirectUri: string, params: Record<string, string>): string {
  const u = new URL(redirectUri);
  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(params)) u.searchParams.set(k, v);
  return u.toString();
}

/**
 * 掛載 OAuth 路由到根 app。呼叫端須把「MCP 端點以外」的根路徑交給此 app。
 * 泛型接受任何帶 `Bindings: Env` 的 Hono 實例（含額外 Variables），故可直接掛在主 app 上。
 */
export function registerOAuthRoutes<
  E extends HonoBaseEnv & { Bindings: Env },
>(app: Hono<E>): void {
  // ── CORS 預檢 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  app.options("/register", (c) => c.body(null, 204, CORS_JSON));
  app.options("/token", (c) => c.body(null, 204, CORS_JSON));
  app.options("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", (c) => c.body(null, 204, CORS_JSON));
  app.options("/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server", (c) => c.body(null, 204, CORS_JSON));

  // ── RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata（根 + /mcp 路徑後綴變體）────────────────
  const prm = (c: { req: { url: string } }) =>
    protectedResourceMetadata(originOf(c.req.url));
  app.get("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", (c) =>
    c.json(prm(c), 200, CORS_JSON));
  app.get("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp", (c) =>
    c.json(prm(c), 200, CORS_JSON));

  // ── RFC 8414 Authorization Server Metadata（根 + /mcp 後綴變體）──────────────────
  const asm = (c: { req: { url: string } }) =>
    authorizationServerMetadata(originOf(c.req.url));
  app.get("/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server", (c) =>
    c.json(asm(c), 200, CORS_JSON));
  app.get("/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/mcp", (c) =>
    c.json(asm(c), 200, CORS_JSON));

  // ── RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration ───────────────────────────────────────
  // public client + PKCE → 不發 client_secret；且刻意「無狀態」不落地 client（見 OAUTH.md 相容決策）。
  app.post("/register", async (c) => {
    // DCR 一律 JSON（RFC 7591）。單次解析取 redirect_uris（陣列）+ client_name。
    let raw: { redirect_uris?: unknown; client_name?: unknown } = {};
    try {
      raw = (await c.req.raw.json()) as typeof raw;
    } catch {
      /* 無 / 非 JSON body：容忍，redirect_uris 視為空 */
    }
    const redirectUris: string[] = Array.isArray(raw.redirect_uris)
      ? raw.redirect_uris.filter((x): x is string => typeof x === "string")
      : [];
    const clientName = typeof raw.client_name === "string" ? raw.client_name : "MCP Client";
    for (const uri of redirectUris) {
      if (!isAllowedRedirect(uri, c.env)) {
        return c.json(
          { error: "invalid_redirect_uri", error_description: `redirect_uri not allowed: ${uri}` },
          400,
          CORS_JSON,
        );
      }
    }
    const clientId = "mcp_" + randomToken(16);
    return c.json(
      {
        client_id: clientId,
        client_id_issued_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
        redirect_uris: redirectUris,
        grant_types: ["authorization_code"],
        response_types: ["code"],
        token_endpoint_auth_method: "none",
        client_name: clientName,
      },
      201,
      CORS_JSON,
    );
  });

  // ── GET /authorize：呈現 owner 祕密同意頁 ───────────────────────────────────────
  app.get("/authorize", (c) => {
    const q = c.req.query();
    if (q.response_type !== "code") {
      return c.text("unsupported_response_type: only 'code' is supported", 400);
    }
    if (q.code_challenge_method !== "S256" || !q.code_challenge) {
      return c.text("invalid_request: PKCE S256 code_challenge required", 400);
    }
    if (!q.redirect_uri || !isAllowedRedirect(q.redirect_uri, c.env)) {
      // redirect_uri 本身可疑 → 絕不 redirect（防 open redirect），直接顯示錯誤。
      return c.text("invalid_request: redirect_uri missing or not allowed", 400);
    }
    const canonicalResource = resourceUri(originOf(c.req.url));
    // RFC 8707：client 傳了 resource 就必須正規化後 == 本 server canonical，否則簽發端 fail fast。
    // redirect_uri 已驗過 → 用 OAuth 錯誤 redirect 帶 error=invalid_target（比顯示 400 更符規範）。
    if (q.resource && !resourceMatches(q.resource, originOf(c.req.url))) {
      return c.redirect(
        redirectWith(q.redirect_uri, {
          error: "invalid_target",
          error_description: "resource does not match this MCP server",
          ...(q.state ? { state: q.state } : {}),
        }),
        302,
      );
    }
    if (!c.env.MCP_OWNER_SECRET) {
      return c.text("server_error: MCP_OWNER_SECRET not configured", 503);
    }
    const params: ConsentParams = {
      client_id: q.client_id ?? "",
      redirect_uri: q.redirect_uri,
      state: q.state ?? "",
      code_challenge: q.code_challenge,
      code_challenge_method: "S256",
      scope: q.scope ?? "mcp",
      resource: canonicalResource, // 一律存 canonical，不存 client 原樣值
    };
    return c.html(consentPage(params));
  });

  // ── POST /authorize：驗 owner 祕密 → 發 authorization code → redirect ───────────
  app.post("/authorize", async (c) => {
    const p = await readParams(c.req.raw);
    const redirectUri = p.redirect_uri ?? "";
    // 再驗一次 redirect_uri（POST 的欄位是隱藏帶回來的，仍須擋竄改）。
    if (!redirectUri || !isAllowedRedirect(redirectUri, c.env)) {
      return c.text("invalid_request: redirect_uri not allowed", 400);
    }
    if (p.code_challenge_method !== "S256" || !p.code_challenge) {
      return c.text("invalid_request: PKCE S256 required", 400);
    }
    const canonicalResource = resourceUri(originOf(c.req.url));
    // RFC 8707：resource（隱藏欄位帶回，仍可能被竄改）→ 正規化後須 == canonical，否則 redirect 帶 invalid_target。
    if (p.resource && !resourceMatches(p.resource, originOf(c.req.url))) {
      return c.redirect(
        redirectWith(redirectUri, {
          error: "invalid_target",
          error_description: "resource does not match this MCP server",
          ...(p.state ? { state: p.state } : {}),
        }),
        302,
      );
    }
    if (!c.env.MCP_OWNER_SECRET) {
      return c.text("server_error: MCP_OWNER_SECRET not configured", 503);
    }
    const consent: ConsentParams = {
      client_id: p.client_id ?? "",
      redirect_uri: redirectUri,
      state: p.state ?? "",
      code_challenge: p.code_challenge,
      code_challenge_method: "S256",
      scope: p.scope ?? "mcp",
      resource: canonicalResource, // 一律存 canonical，不存 client 原樣值
    };
    // ★ owner 祕密把關：錯誤不發碼、重顯同意頁。這是「只知 URL 的人進不來」的唯一閘。
    const supplied = p.owner_secret ?? "";
    if (!supplied || !constantTimeEqual(supplied, c.env.MCP_OWNER_SECRET)) {
      return c.html(consentPage(consent, "Owner 祕密不正確，請重試。"), 401);
    }
    if (!c.env.OAUTH_KV) {
      return c.text("server_error: OAUTH_KV not configured", 503);
    }
    const code = randomToken(32);
    await putAuthCode(c.env.OAUTH_KV, code, {
      client_id: consent.client_id,
      redirect_uri: redirectUri,
      code_challenge: consent.code_challenge,
      code_challenge_method: "S256",
      scope: consent.scope,
      resource: consent.resource,
      namespace: ownerNamespace(c.env),
    });
    const location = redirectWith(redirectUri, {
      code,
      ...(consent.state ? { state: consent.state } : {}),
    });
    return c.redirect(location, 302);
  });

  // ── POST /token：code + PKCE verifier → access_token ────────────────────────────
  app.post("/token", async (c) => {
    const p = await readParams(c.req.raw);
    const err = (code: string, desc: string, status = 400) =>
      c.json({ error: code, error_description: desc }, status as 400, CORS_JSON);

    if (p.grant_type !== "authorization_code") {
      return err("unsupported_grant_type", "only authorization_code is supported");
    }
    if (!p.code || !p.code_verifier || !p.redirect_uri) {
      return err("invalid_request", "code, code_verifier and redirect_uri are required");
    }
    // RFC 8707：token request 帶 resource 就得正規化後 == canonical，否則簽發端拒（400 invalid_target）。
    if (p.resource && !resourceMatches(p.resource, originOf(c.req.url))) {
      return err("invalid_target", "resource does not match this MCP server");
    }
    if (!c.env.OAUTH_KV) {
      return err("server_error", "OAUTH_KV not configured", 503);
    }
    const data = await consumeAuthCode(c.env.OAUTH_KV, p.code); // 一次性
    if (!data) {
      return err("invalid_grant", "authorization code invalid or expired");
    }
    if (data.redirect_uri !== p.redirect_uri) {
      return err("invalid_grant", "redirect_uri mismatch");
    }
    if (p.client_id && data.client_id && p.client_id !== data.client_id) {
      return err("invalid_grant", "client_id mismatch");
    }
    const pkceOk = await verifyPkceS256(p.code_verifier, data.code_challenge, data.code_challenge_method);
    if (!pkceOk) {
      return err("invalid_grant", "PKCE verification failed");
    }

    const ttl = tokenTtl(c.env);
    const accessToken = randomToken(32);
    await putAccessToken(
      c.env.OAUTH_KV,
      accessToken,
      {
        namespace: data.namespace,
        client_id: data.client_id,
        scope: data.scope,
        // RFC 8707：aud 一律用「本 server canonical resource URI」（非 client 原樣值）。
        // authorize 已只存 canonical，這裡再以當前 origin 重算一次確保與 partner-auth 嚴格比對一致。
        aud: resourceUri(originOf(c.req.url)),
        exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + ttl,
      },
      ttl,
    );
    return c.json(
      {
        access_token: accessToken,
        token_type: "Bearer",
        expires_in: ttl,
        scope: data.scope,
      },
      200,
      CORS_JSON,
    );
  });
}

export { AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS };